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An imprecise Bayesian nonparametric approach to system reliability with multiple types 
of components is developed. This allows modelling partial or imperfect prior knowledge 
on component failure distributions in a ﬂexible way through bounds on the functioning 
probability. Given component level test data these bounds are propagated to bounds on the 
posterior predictive distribution for the functioning probability of a new system containing 
components exchangeable with those used in testing. The method further enables 
identiﬁcation of prior–data conﬂict at the system level based on component level test 
data. New results on ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance for the Beta-Binomial distribution 
make the technique computationally tractable. Our methodological contributions can be 
immediately used in applications by reliability practitioners as we provide easy to use 
software tools.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC 
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
System reliability analysis is concerned with estimating the lifetime Tsys of complex systems. Usually, the goal is to 
determine the system reliability function Rsys(t) = P (Tsys > t) based on the lifetime distributions of system components.
A critique of the methodological approach to a reliability analysis may often encompass a few common concerns. First, 
in a parametric setting, there may be no particularly strong reason to believe that the small part of component model 
space covered by a particular probability distribution necessarily contains the ‘true’ component lifetime distribution. Fur-
ther, Bayesian methods may be invoked in order to incorporate expert opinion or other knowledge which falls outside the 
speciﬁc testing data under consideration. The classic concern here is in whether one can truly express ones beliefs with 
the exactness a prior distribution requires. Finally, it would be valuable in application to have a means of identifying when 
the prior choice is having a strong effect and when not. Any method hoping to address these concerns must do so whilst 
enabling realistic system models (with heterogeneous component types) and remain computationally tractable.
Herein, we make steps toward addressing these concerns by developing a nonparametric method which utilises imprecise 
probability [4,27] to model more vague or imperfect prior beliefs using upper and lower probabilities. This overcomes 
the concern about component lifetimes being outside a particular parametric family, uses a more ﬂexible prior modelling 
framework and leads to an easy method of detecting conﬂicts between prior assumptions and observed failure times in test 
data. In the general context of Bayesian methods, this phenomenon is known as prior–data conﬂict, see, e.g., [17] or [9].
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heterogeneous component types laid out in any arbitrary manner. By separating the (time-invariant) system structure from 
the time-dependent failure probabilities of components, it allows straightforward and eﬃcient computation of Rsys(t).
Our imprecise probability approach provides bounds for Rsys(t) by computing, for each t in an arbitrarily ﬁne grid of 
time points T , the posterior predictive probability interval for the event Tsys > t . Assuming the number of functioning 
components for each type and time t as binomially distributed, the intervals are derived from an imprecise Bayesian model 
using sets of conjugate Beta priors which allow to specify weak or partial prior information in an intuitive way. The width 
of the resulting posterior predictive probability intervals reﬂects the precision of the corresponding probability statements: 
a short range indicates that the system functioning probability can be quantiﬁed quite precisely, while a large range will 
indicate that our (probabilistic) knowledge is indeterminate. In particular, prior–data conﬂict leads to more cautious prob-
ability statements: When there is not enough data to overrule the prior, it is unclear whether to put more trust to prior 
assumptions or to the observations, and posterior inferences clearly reﬂect this state of uncertainty by larger ranges.
Our approach extends the literature on reliability with imprecise probability (for an overview see [26]) by integrating the 
learning of component reliabilities based on test data, in combination with the use of the survival signature. Approaches to 
system reliability based on generalisations of Bayesian networks like evidential networks [24] and credal networks [1] do 
usually not include test data in the model. Doing so is certainly possible in these frameworks, but this would add further 
to the complexity of the Bayesian network representation, in which updating (i.e., calculating posterior reliabilities) for each 
time t is generally NP-hard [20]. While determining the survival signature is also NP-hard, this has to be done only once 
in our approach. Furthermore, new results on ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance for the Beta-Binomial distribution keep the 
need for numerical optimisation in our model to a minimum.
In Section 2 we review the survival signature and in Section 3 we review the nonparametric approach to Bayesian 
reliability analysis upon which our work builds [3]. Section 4 details the reparameterisation of that approach which enables 
the natural formulation of the system reliability bounds, leading to nice closed form results in some later theory. Section 5
lays the ground work to incorporate imprecise probability, culminating in the main results and contributions of this work, 
detailed in Section 6. Section 7 provides details on the software contributions of this work and shows two worked examples 
demonstrating the practicality and usefulness of the method.
2. Survival signature
In the mathematical theory of reliability, the main focus is on the functioning of a system given the functioning, or 
not, of its components and the structure of the system. The mathematical concept which is central to this theory is the 
structure function [5]. For a system with m components, let state vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ {0, 1}m , with xi = 1 if the ith 
component functions and xi = 0 if not. The labelling of the components is arbitrary but must be ﬁxed to deﬁne x. The 
structure function φ : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}, deﬁned for all possible x, takes the value 1 if the system functions and 0 if the 
system does not function for state vector x. Most practical systems are coherent, which means that φ(x) is non-decreasing 
in any of the components of x, so system functioning cannot be improved by worse performance of one or more of its 
components. The assumption of coherent systems is also convenient from the perspective of uncertainty quantiﬁcation for 
system reliability. It is further logical to assume that φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1, so the system fails if all its components fail 
and it functions if all its components function.
For larger systems, working with the full structure function may be complicated, and one may particularly only need 
a summary of the structure function in case the system has exchangeable components of one or more types. We use 
the term ‘exchangeable components’ to indicate that the failure times of the components in the system are exchange-
able [16]. Coolen and Coolen-Maturi [11] introduced such a summary, called the survival signature, to facilitate reliability 
analyses for systems with multiple types of components. In case of just a single type of components, the survival sig-
nature is closely related to the system signature [22], which is well-established and the topic of many research papers 
during the last decade. However, generalisation of the signature to systems with multiple types of components is ex-
tremely complicated (as it involves ordering order statistics of different distributions), so much so that it cannot be 
applied to most practical systems. In addition to the possible use for such systems, where the beneﬁt only occurs if there 
are multiple components of the same types, the survival signature is arguably also easier to interpret than the signa-
ture.
Consider a system with K ≥ 1 types of components, with mk components of type k ∈ {1, . . . , K } and ∑Kk=1mk = m. 
Assume that the random failure times of components of the same type are exchangeable [16]. Due to the arbitrary ordering 
of the components in the state vector, components of the same type can be grouped together, leading to a state vector that 
can be written as x = (x1, x2, . . . , xK ), with xk = (xk1, xk2, . . . , xkmk ) the sub-vector representing the states of the components 
of type k.
The survival signature for such a system, denoted by (l1, . . . , lK ), with lk = 0, 1, . . . , mk for k = 1, . . . , K , is deﬁned as the 
probability for the event that the system functions given that precisely lk of its mk components of type k function, for each 
k ∈ {1, . . . , K } [11]. Essentially, this creates a K -dimensional partition for the event Tsys > t , such that Rsys(t) = P (Tsys > t)
can be calculated using the law of total probability:
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m1∑
l1=0
· · ·
mK∑
lK=0
P (Tsys > t | C1t = l1, . . . ,C Kt = lK )P
( K⋂
k=1
{Ckt = lk}
)
=
m1∑
l1=0
· · ·
mK∑
lK=0
(l1, . . . , lK )P
( K⋂
k=1
{Ckt = lk}
)
, (1)
where Ckt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , mk} denotes the random number of components of type k functioning at time t .
For calculating the survival signature based on the structure function, observe that there are 
(mk
lk
)
state vectors xk with ∑mk
i=1 x
k
i = lk . Let Sklk denote the set of these state vectors for components of type k and let Sl1,...,lK denote the set of all state 
vectors for the whole system for which 
∑mk
i=1 x
k
i = lk , k = 1, . . . , K . Due to the exchangeability assumption for the failure 
times of the mk components of type k, all the state vectors xk ∈ Sklk are equally likely to occur, hence [11]
(l1, . . . , lK ) =
[
K∏
k=1
(
mk
lk
)−1]
×
∑
x∈Sl1,...,lK
φ(x) . (2)
It should be emphasised that when using the survival signature, there are no restrictions on dependence of the failure 
times of components of different types, as the probability P (
⋂K
k=1{Ckt = lk}) can take any form of dependence into account, 
for example one can include common-cause failures quite straightforwardly into this approach [12]. However, there is a 
substantial simpliﬁcation if one can assume that the failure times of components of different types are independent, and 
even more so if one can assume that the failure times of components of type k are conditionally independent and identically 
distributed with CDF Fk(t). With these assumptions, we get
Rsys(t) =
m1∑
l1=0
· · ·
mK∑
lK=0
[
(l1, . . . , lK )
K∏
k=1
((
mk
lk
)
[Fk(t)]mk−lk [1− Fk(t)]lk
)]
.
We will employ both assumptions in this paper, leading to Ckt having a Beta-Binomial distribution, giving us a closed form 
expression for P (Ckt = lk) for all t , k, and lk .
The main advantage of the survival signature, in line with this property of the signature for systems with a single 
type of components [22], is that the information about the system structure is fully separated from the information about 
functioning of the components, which simpliﬁes related statistical inference as well as considerations of optimal system 
design. In particular for study of system reliability over time, with the structure of the system, and hence the survival 
signature, not changing, this separation also enables relatively straightforward statistical inferences.
There are several relatively straightforward generalisations of the use of the survival signature. The probabilities for the 
numbers of functioning components can be generalised to lower and upper probabilities, as e.g. done by Coolen et al. [14]
within the nonparametric predictive inference (NPI) framework of statistics [10], where lower and upper probabilities for 
the events Ck = lk are inferred from test data on components of the same types as those in the system. This is an approach 
that is also followed in the current paper, but with the use of generalised Bayesian inference instead of NPI. Like Coolen 
et al. [14], we will utilise the monotonicity of the survival signature for coherent systems to simplify computations.
While there are, as mentioned above, no restrictions on dependence of failure times of components of different types 
that can be reﬂected by the survival signature method, some possible dependencies will require thoughtful consideration. 
For example, it may be the case that components that are near to each other in the system have a stronger dependency of 
their failure times than components that are further apart. If this is the case there are several options, the two main ones 
are as follows. First, if there is detailed knowledge about such dependence (as e.g. modelled in popular spatial statistics 
approaches) then there are probably no components that can be grouped, hence one has to use the full structure function. 
In practice, this may be feasible for small systems, but for large systems one would probably still wish to make some 
exchangeability assumptions in order to enable analysis, where it is understood that this is only approximate. The second 
case results from this, namely that one can still deﬁne groups of components which have exchangeable failure times and 
which are related in the same way to other groups of components to facilitate the dependence modelling. For example, one 
might consider components in a large electricity network to have differing failure time characteristics depending on physical 
location, e.g. windturbines near hills or at sea, while apart from the location aspect one would consider their failure times 
exchangeable. In such cases, these are represented by different groups in the survival signature approach.
3. Nonparametric Bayesian approach for component reliability
Let us denote the random failure time of component number i of type k by T ki , i = 1, . . . , mk . The failure time distribution 
can be written in terms of the cdf Fk(t) = P (T ki ≤ t), or in terms of the reliability function Rk(t) = P (T ki > t) = 1 − Fk(t), 
also known as the survival function. For a nonparametric description of Rk(t), we consider a set of time points t , t ∈ T =
{t1, . . . , tmax}.
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0) with parameter pkt , so that
P
(
I(T ki > t) = 1
)= pkt ,
P
(
I(T ki > t) = 0
)= 1− pkt .
That is, I(T ki > t) ∼ Bernoulli(pkt ), i = 1, . . . , mk , t ∈ T .
The set of probabilities {pkt , t ∈ T } deﬁnes a discrete failure time distribution for components of type k through
Rk(t j) = P (T k > t j) = pkt j , t j = t1, . . . , tmax .
We can also express this failure time distribution through the probability mass function (pmf) and discrete hazard function,
f k(t j) = P
(
T k ∈ (t j, t j+1]
)= pkt j − pkt j+1 ,
hk(t j) = P
(
T k ∈ (t j, t j+1] | T k > t j
)= f k(t j)
Rk(t j)
.
The time grid T can be chosen to be appropriately dense for the application at hand, where a simple extension between 
grid points can be made by taking Rk(·) to be the right continuous step function induced by the grid values, Rk(t) = pkt j , t ∈
[t j, t j+1), or by taking pkt j and pkt j+1 as upper and lower bounds for Rk(t), t ∈ [t j, t j+1).
The independence assumption for components of the same type immediately implies that the number of functioning 
components of type k in the system is binomially distributed, Ckt =
∑mk
i=1 I(T
k
i > t) ∼ Binomial(pkt , mk).
The sequence of pkt ’s can, in theory, be directly chosen to arbitrarily closely approximate any valid lifetime pdf on [0, ∞), 
for example matching a bathtub curve for the corresponding hazard rate hk(t j). Naturally, pkt j ≥ pkt j+1 should hold (assuming 
no repair). However, such direct speciﬁcation is non-trivial, neglects any inherent uncertainty in the particular choice, and 
cannot be easily combined with test data. To account for the uncertainty, one can express knowledge about pkt through 
a prior distribution. A convenient and natural choice is pkt ∼ Beta(αkt , βkt ), particularly because in a Bayesian inferential 
setting this is the conjugate prior which leads to a Beta posterior.
Let the lifetime test data collected on component k be tk = (tk1, . . . , tknk ). At each ﬁxed time t ∈ T , this corresponds to an 
observation from the Binomial model described above, skt =
∑nk
i=1 I(t
k
i > t). The posterior is then p
k
t | skt ∼ Beta(αkt + skt , βkt +
nk − skt ). The combination of a Binomial observation model with a Beta prior is often called Beta-Binomial model.
The posterior predictive distribution for the number of components surviving at time t in a new system, based 
on the lifetime data and the prior information, is then given by a so-called Beta-Binomial distribution, Ckt | skt ∼
Beta-Binomial(mk, αkt + skt , βkt + nk − skt ). That is, we have
P (Ckt = lk | skt ) =
(
mk
lk
)
B(lk + αkt + skt ,mk − lk + βkt + nk − skt )
B(αkt + skt , βkt + nk − skt )
,
where B(·, ·) is the Beta function. This posterior predictive distribution is essentially a Binomial distribution where the 
functioning probability pkt takes values in [0, 1] with the probability given by the posterior on pkt .
Consequently, in order to calculate the system reliability according to (1), for each component type k we need lifetime 
data tk , and have to choose 2 × |T | parameters to specify the prior distribution for the discrete survival function of T ki . In 
total, values for 2 × |T | × K parameters must be chosen.
4. Reparameterisation of the Beta distribution
The parametrisation of the Beta distribution used above is common, and allows αkt and β
k
t to be interpreted as hypothet-
ical numbers of functioning and failed components of type k at time t , respectively. However, as recognised by [27, §5.3], 
when we generalise to sets of priors in the sequel, it is useful to consider a different parametrisation.
For clarity of presentation we will temporarily drop the super- and subscript k and t indices for component type and 
time. Instead of α and β , we consider the parameters n(0) ∈ [0, ∞) and y(0) ∈ [0, 1], where
n(0) = α + β and y(0) = α
α + β , (3)
or equivalently, α = n(0) y(0) and β = n(0)(1 − y(0)). The upper index (0) is used to identify these as prior parameter 
values, in contrast to their posterior values n(n) and y(n) obtained after observing n failure times (see below). n(0) and 
y(0) are sometimes called canonical parameters, identiﬁed from rewriting the density in canonical form; see for example
[8, pp. 202 and 272f], or [29, §1.2.3.1]. This canonical form gives a common structure to all conjugacy results in exponential 
families.
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probability p, and that larger n(0) values lead to greater concentration of probability measure around y(0) , since Var(p) =
y(0)(1−y(0))
n(0)+1 . Consequently, n
(0) represents the prior strength and moreover can be directly interpreted as a pseudocount, as 
will become clear. Indeed, consider the posterior given that s out of n components function: by conjugacy p | s is Beta 
distributed with updated parameters
n(n) = n(0) + n , y(n) = n
(0)
n(0) + n · y
(0) + n
n(0) + n ·
s
n
. (4)
Thus, after observing that s out of n components function (at time t), the posterior mean y(n) for p is a weighted average 
of the prior mean y(0) and s/n (the fraction of functioning components in the data), with weights proportional to n(0) and 
n, respectively. Therefore n(0) takes on the same role for the prior mean y(0) as the sample size n does for the observed 
mean s/n, leading to the notion of it being a pseudocount.
Reintroducing time and component type indices, the posterior predictive Beta-Binomial probability mass function (pmf) 
can be written in terms of the updated parameters as
P (Ckt = lk | skt ) =
(
mk
lk
) B(lk + n(n)k,t y(n)k,t ,mk − lk + n(n)k,t (1− y(n)k,t ))
B(n(n)k,t y
(n)
k,t ,n
(n)
k,t (1− y(n)k,t ))
, (5)
with the corresponding cumulative mass function (cmf) given by
FCkt |skt (lk) = P (C
k
t ≤ lk | skt ) =
lk∑
jk=0
P (Ckt = jk | skt ) . (6)
The parameterisation in terms of prior mean and prior strength (or pseudocount) makes clear that in this conjugate 
setting, learning from data corresponds to averaging between prior and data. This form is attractive not only because it 
enhances the interpretability of the model and prior speciﬁcation, but crucially it also makes clear what should be a serious 
concern in any Bayesian analysis: when observed data differ greatly from what is expressed in the prior, this conﬂict is 
simply averaged out and is not reﬂected in the posterior or posterior predictive distributions.
As a simple example, imagine that we expect pkt to be about 0.75 for a certain k and t , so we choose y
(0)
k,t = 0.75, and 
that we value this choice of mean functioning probability with n(0)k,t = 8, i.e., equivalently to having seen 8 observations with 
a mean 0.75. If we observe nk = 16 components of type k in the test data and skt = 12 function at time t , then skt /nk = 0.75
as we expect, so that the updated parameters are n(n)k,t = 24, y(n)k,t = 0.75. However, in contrast, unexpectedly observing that 
no component functions at time t instead leads to parameters n(n)k,t = 24, y(n)k,t = 0.25. The prior and the posteriors based on 
these two scenarios are depicted in the left panels of Fig. 1, along with their corresponding predictive Beta-binomial pmf 
and cmf for the case mk = 5 (right panels).
Due to symmetry, we see that both posteriors have the same variance, although arising from two fundamentally different 
scenarios. Posterior 1 is based on data exactly according to prior expectations; the increase in conﬁdence on pkt ≈ 0.75 is 
reﬂected in a more concentrated posterior density, and the posterior predictive is changed only slightly. However, it may 
be cause for concern to see the same degree of conﬁdence in Posterior 2, which is based on data that is in sharp conﬂict 
with prior expectations. Posterior 2 places most probability weight around 0.25, averaging between prior expectation and 
data, with the same variance as Posterior 1. Accordingly, rather than conveying the conﬂict between observed and expected 
functioning probabilities with increased variance, Posterior 2 instead gives a false sense of certainty.
To enable diagnosis of when this undesirable behaviour occurs, we propose to use an imprecise probability approach 
based on sets of Beta priors, described in the following section.
5. Sets of Beta priors
As was shown by Walter and Augustin [30], we can have both tractability and meaningful reaction to prior–data conﬂict 
by using sets of priors M(0)k,t produced by parameter sets (0)k,t = [n(0)k,t , n(0)k,t ] × [y(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ] (a detailed discussion of different 
choices for (0)k,t is given in Walter [29, §3.1].) In our model, each prior parameter pair (n
(0)
k,t , y
(0)
k,t ) ∈ (0)k,t corresponds to 
a Beta prior, thus M(0)k,t is a set of Beta priors. The set of posteriors M(n)k,t is obtained by updating each prior in M(0)k,t
according to Bayes’ Rule. This element-by-element updating can be rigorously justiﬁed as ensuring coherence [27, §2.5], 
and was termed “Generalised Bayes’ Rule” by Walley [27, §6.4]. Due to conjugacy, M(n)k,t is a set of Beta distributions with 
parameters (n(n)k,t , y
(n)
k,t ), obtained by updating (n
(0)
k,t , y
(0)
k,t ) ∈ (0)k,t according to (4), leading to the set of updated parameters

(n)
k,t =
{
(n(n)k,t , y
(n)
k,t ) | (n(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ) ∈ (0)k,t = [n(0)k,t ,n(0)k,t ] × [y(0)k,t , y
(0)
k,t ]
}
. (7)
72 G. Walter et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 80 (2017) 67–88Fig. 1. Beta densities (top left) and cdfs (bottom left), with the corresponding Beta-binomial predictive probability mass functions (top right) and cumulative 
mass functions (bottom right), for a prior with n(0)k,t = 8, y(0)k,t = 0.75, and posteriors based on nkt = 16 observations with skt = 12 (Posterior 1) and skt = 0
(Posterior 2), respectively. Data for Posterior 1 conﬁrm prior assumptions, while data for Posterior 2 are in conﬂict with the prior. However, this conﬂict is 
averaged out, and Posterior 1 and Posterior 2 have the same spread, both in the posterior pdf/cdf and the posterior predictive pmf/cmf, such that Posterior 2 
gives a false sense of certainty despite the massive conﬂict between prior and data.
Fig. 2. Prior parameter set (0)k,t = [1, 8] ×[0.7, 0.8] and posterior parameter set (n)k,t for data skt /nk = 12/16 (Posterior 1, left) and skt /nk = 0/16 (Posterior 2, 
right). For no-conﬂict data (skt /nk ∈ [y(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ]), (n)k,t has the ‘spotlight’ shape (left); in case of prior–data conﬂict (skt /nk 
∈ [y(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ]), (n)k,t has the ‘banana’ 
shape (right), leading to a large degree of imprecision in the y(n)k,t dimension of 
(n)
k,t , thus reﬂecting increased uncertainty about the functioning probability 
pkt due to the conﬂict between prior assumptions and observed data.
Examples for parameter sets (0)k,t and 
(n)
k,t as in (7) are depicted in Fig. 2. Such rectangular prior parameter sets 

(0)
k,t have been shown to balance desirable model properties and ease of elicitation (see Walter [29, pp. 123f] or Troffaes 
et al. [25]). For each component type k and time point t , one need only specify the four parameters n(0)k,t , n
(0)
k,t , y
(0)
k,t , y
(0)
k,t (so 
in total 4 × |T | parameters are needed to deﬁne the set of prior distributions on the survival function of each component).
A desirable inference property arising from this setup is that the posterior parameter set (n)k,t is not rectangular in the 
way that the prior parameter set is. Indeed, the shape of (n)k,t depends on the presence or absence of prior–data conﬂict, 
which is naturally operationalised as skt /nk 
∈ [y(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ]: that is, prior–data conﬂict is deﬁned to occur when, at time t , the 
observed fraction of functioning components is outside its a priori expected range.
First, in the absence of prior–data conﬂict, (n)k,t shrinks in the yk,t dimension; how much it shrinks depending on 
n(0)k,t ∈ [n(0)k,t , n(0)k,t ], leading to the so-called spotlight shape depicted in Fig. 2 (left). Since y(n)k,t gives the posterior expectation 
for the functioning probability pkt , shorter y
(n) intervals mean more precise knowledge about pkt . Also, the variance interval k,t
G. Walter et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 80 (2017) 67–88 73Fig. 3. Sets of Beta pdfs (left) and Beta-Binomial cmfs (right, for mk = 5) corresponding to the prior and posterior parameter sets in Fig. 2. The sets are 
depicted as shaded areas, with the distributions corresponding to the four corners of the prior parameter set (0)k,t (or their posterior counterparts) as solid 
lines. The top row depicts the set of prior cdfs/cmfs and the set of posterior cdfs/cmfs for the case where data conﬁrm prior assumptions (see left panel 
of Fig. 2); the bottom row depicts the (identical) set of prior cdfs/cmfs and the set of posterior cdfs/cmfs in case of prior–data conﬂict (see right panel 
of Fig. 2). The set of posterior cdfs and cmfs is much larger in case of prior–data conﬂict: uncertainty due to this conﬂict is reﬂected through increased 
imprecision.
for pkt (not shown) will shorten and shift towards zero, as the Beta distributions in M(n)k,t will be more concentrated due to 
the increase of n(0)k,t to n
(n)
k,t .
Alternatively, when there is conﬂict between prior and observed data (i.e. skt /nk 
∈ [y(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ]), (n)k,t instead adopts the 
so-called ‘banana shape’, arising from the intervals for y(n)k,t being shifted closer to s
k
t /nk for lower n
(n)
k,t values than for higher 
n(n)k,t values, see Fig. 2 (right). Overall, this results in a wider y
(n)
k,t interval compared to the no conﬂict case, reﬂecting the 
extra uncertainty due to prior–data conﬂict. In other words, the posterior sets make more cautious probability statements 
about pkt , as desired in this scenario.
Based on these shapes and (4), it is possible to deduce the following expressions for the lower and upper bounds of y(n)k,t :
min

(n)
k,t
y(n)k,t =
{(
n(0)k,t y
(0)
k,t + skt
)
/
(
n(0)k,t + nk
)
if skt /nk ≥ y(0)k,t(
n(0)k,t y
(0)
k,t + skt
)
/
(
n(0)k,t + nk
)
if skt /nk < y
(0)
k,t
,
max

(n)
k,t
y(n)k,t =
{(
n(0)k,t y
(0)
k,t + skt
)
/
(
n(0)k,t + nk
)
if skt /nk ≤ y(0)k,t(
n(0)k,t y
(0)
k,t + skt
)
/
(
n(0)k,t + nk
)
if skt /nk > y
(0)
k,t
.
(8)
Note that the lower bound for y(n)k,t is always attained at y
(0)
k,t , the upper bound at y
(0)
k,t . Also note that when s
k
t /nk ∈
[y(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ], both the lower and the upper bounds for y(n)k,t are attained at n(0)k,t , corresponding to the spotlight shape. However, 
when skt /nk 
∈ [y(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ], the banana shape indicates that one of the bounds for y(n)k,t is attained at n(0)k,t .
The different locations and sizes of (n)k,t in the conﬂict versus no conﬂict case are then, in turn, also reﬂected in the 
corresponding sets of Beta cdfs and Beta-Binomial cmfs. As an example, those corresponding to the parameter sets in Fig. 2
are depicted in Fig. 3.
In the no conﬂict case (Posterior 1, top row), the reduction of the y(n)k,t range in 
(n)
k,t leads to a much smaller set of Beta 
and Beta-Binomial distributions. For example, the range of predictive probabilities that two out of a set of ﬁve components 
of type k function at time t has changed from [0.10, 0.28] a priori to [0.11, 0.14] a posteriori. This reﬂects the gain in 
precision due to test data in accordance with prior assumptions.
In contrast, for the prior–data conﬂict case (Posterior 2, bottom row), the wide y(n)k,t range in 
(n)
k,t leads to a set of Beta 
and Beta-Binomial distributions that is much larger than in the no conﬂict case. Here, the range of posterior predictive 
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less precise than in the no conﬂict case. Using sets of Beta priors, the resulting set of posterior predictive Beta-Binomial 
distributions reﬂects the precision of prior information, the amount of data, and prior–data conﬂict.
Furthermore, with sets of Beta priors it is also possible to express prior ignorance by letting y(0)k,t → 0 and y(0)k,t → 1
for some or all t ∈ T . Such models are called near-noninformative or near-ignorance models in the imprecise probability 
literature (see Walley [27, §5.3.2] for Beta priors, [28] for Dirichlet priors, and Benavoli and Zaffalon [6,7] for exponential 
family priors), as they provide vacuous bounds only for a certain class of inferences, and the choice for the prior strength 
parameter n(0)k,t inﬂuences posterior inferences. (Note that it is not advisable to choose y
(0)
k,t = 0 and y(0)k,t = 1, as this can 
lead to improper posterior predictive distributions. For example, at any t <min(tk), we would have y(n)k,t = 1, leading to one 
argument of the Beta function in the denominator of (5) being zero.) The limits y(0)k,t → 0 and y(0)k,t → 1 imply we are only 
prepared to give trivial bounds for the functioning probability and do not wish to commit to any speciﬁc knowledge about 
pkt a priori. This provides a more natural choice of ‘noninformative’ prior over [0, 1] than the usual choice of a Beta prior 
with αkt = βkt = 1 (or n(0)k,t = 2, y(0)k,t = 0.5). Such a prior for all t ∈ T actually reﬂects a belief that the component reliability 
function is on average 1/2 for all t , which is not an expression of ignorance, but rather a very speciﬁc (and arguably peculiar) 
prior belief.
In a near-noninformative setting, the choice of n(0)k,t is not relevant, because (8) implies both lower and upper bound 
for y(n)k,t are obtained with n
(0)
k,t . In particular, y
(0)
k,t > 0 and y
(0)
k,t < 1 can be chosen such that 
skt
nk
∈ [y(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ] for all t ∈(
min(tk), max(tk)
)
. Naturally, one cannot have prior–data conﬂict in cases of near prior ignorance.
6. Sets of system reliability functions
The elements reviewed and extended above culminate hereinafter in the primary contribution of the current work, 
providing a framework in which the nonparametric Bayesian system reliability approach developed in [3] is extended to 
sets of system reliability functions by incorporating the sets of priors approach of Walter and Augustin [30]. This allows for 
partial or vague speciﬁcation of prior component reliability functions, and enables diagnosis of prior–data conﬂict which is 
consequential at the system level.
6.1. Computation of bounds
To obtain the lower and upper bound for the system reliability function Rsys(t), we now need to minimise and maximise 
Equation (1) over (0)1,t , . . . , 
(0)
K ,t for each t , where the posterior predictive probabilities for C
k
t are given by the Beta-Binomial 
pmf (5). We therefore have
Rsys(t | t1, . . . , tK )
= min

(0)
1,t ,...,
(0)
K ,t
Rsys(t | (0)1,t , . . . ,(0)K ,t, t1, . . . , tK )
= min

(0)
1,t ,...,
(0)
K ,t
m1∑
l1=0
· · ·
mK∑
lK=0
(l1, . . . , lK )
K∏
k=1
P (Ckt = lk | y(0)k,t ,n(0)k,t , skt )
= min

(0)
1,t ,...,
(0)
K ,t
m1∑
l1=0
· · ·
mK∑
lK=0
(l1, . . . , lK )×
K∏
k=1
(
mk
lk
) B(lk + n(n)k,t y(n)k,t ,mk − lk + n(n)k,t (1− y(n)k,t ))
B(n(n)k,t y
(n)
k,t ,n
(n)
k,t (1− y(n)k,t ))
= min

(0)
1,t ,...,
(0)
K ,t
m1∑
l1=0
· · ·
mK∑
lK=0
(l1, . . . , lK )×
K∏
k=1
(
mk
lk
) B(lk + n(0)k,t y(0)k,t + skt ,mk − lk + n(0)k,t (1− y(0)k,t ) + nk − skt )
B(n(0)k,t y
(0)
k,t + skt ,n(0)k,t (1− y(0)k,t ) + nk − skt )
, (9)
and similarly maximising for Rsys(·). In doing so, we assume components of the same type k to be exchangeable given 

(0)
k,t [4, see §3.4 on extending exchangeability to imprecise probability], and components of different types to follow strong 
independence [4, see §3.2.4].
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P (Ckt = lk | y(0)k,t , n(0)k,t , skt ) for each k, then this ordering can be used to determine the elements of (0)k,t which minimise 
and maximise the overall system reliability function without resorting to computationally expensive exhaustive searches or 
numerical optimisation.
We therefore start by providing the following result, where indices are suppressed for readability. We use ≥st to denote 
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
Theorem 1. Let βy denote the Beta-Binomial distribution with probability mass function parameterised as:
p(l | y,n,m, s,N) ∝ B(l + ny + s,m− l + n(1− y) + N − s)
B(ny + s,n(1− y) + N − s) ,
with n, m, s, and N ﬁxed and unknown.
Then βy ≥st βy ∀ y > y with y, y ∈ (0, 1).
The proof is provided in Appendix A, p. 81.
Consequently, for each component, the posterior predictive Beta-Binomial distributions with larger prior functioning 
probability stochastically dominate those with smaller prior functioning probability, providing rigorous proof which accords 
with intuition. Applying this result to the sets of system reliability functions, together with the monotonicity in the survival 
signature, means that Rsys(·) is attained when y(0)k,t = y(0)k,t and Rsys(·) is attained when y(0)k,t = y(0)k,t for all possible n(0)k,t values.
The analogous result for n(0)k,t is more subtle, because stochastic dominance is not guaranteed at a single value. The 
following Theorem provides simple suﬃcient conditions under which an upper or lower limit has ﬁrst-order stochastic 
dominance and has virtually no computational overhead to test.
Theorem 2. Let βn denote the Beta-Binomial distribution with probability mass function parameterised as:
p(l | y,n,m, s,N) ∝ B(l + ny + s,m− l + n(1− y) + N − s)
B(ny + s,n(1− y) + N − s) ,
with y, m, s, and N ﬁxed and unknown. Then,
y >
s +m− 1
N +m− 1 =⇒ βn ≥st βn
and
y <
s
N +m− 1 =⇒ βn ≤st βn
The proof is provided in Appendix A, p. 82.
If sN+m−1 < y <
s+m−1
N+m−1 then Theorem 2 cannot determine stochastic dominance. The following lemma which is slightly 
more computationally costly, but still much faster than an exhaustive search, may be able to determine ﬁrst-order stochastic 
dominance in such situations.
Lemma 3. Let βn denote the Beta-Binomial distribution as in Theorem 2. Deﬁne
Ln,n(l) := p(l | y,n,m, s,N)p(l | y,n,m, s,N)
Then,
Ln,n(0) ≤ 1
Ln,n(m) ≥ 1
}
=⇒ βn ≥st βn
and
Ln,n(0) ≥ 1
Ln,n(m) ≤ 1
}
=⇒ βn ≤st βn
The proof is provided in Appendix A, p. 83. In the cases where neither Theorem 2 or Lemma 3 apply, the entire posterior 
system reliability function must be optimised to ﬁnd the minima/maxima. In practice, in the examples to be presented in 
the sequel, Theorem 2 and Lemma 3 do provide guarantees of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance for the vast majority of time 
points, t , substantially lowering the computational costs of performing the minimisation/maximisation involved in ﬁnding 
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get exponentially slower in the number of different components). Appendix B provides a detailed discussion of exactly how 
often these bounds hold and how often one must resort to numerical optimisation.
Thus, due to Theorems 1, 2 and Lemma 3, (9) transforms to
Rsys(t | t1, . . . , tK )
= min

(0)
1,t ,...,
(0)
K ,t
m1∑
l1=0
· · ·
mK∑
lK=0
(l1, . . . , lK )×
K∏
k=1
(
mk
lk
) B(lk + n(0)k,t y(0)k,t + skt ,mk − lk + n(0)k,t (1− y(0)k,t ) + nk − skt )
B(n(0)k,t y
(0)
k,t + skt ,n(0)k,t (1− y(0)k,t ) + nk − skt )
=
m1∑
l1=0
· · ·
mK∑
lK=0
(l1, . . . , lK )×
K∏
k=1
(
mk
lk
) B(lk + n˜(0)k,t y(0)k,t + skt ,mk − lk + n˜(0)k,t (1− y(0)k,t ) + nk − skt )
B (˜n(0)k,t y
(0)
k,t + skt , n˜(0)k,t (1− y(0)k,t ) + nk − skt )
(10)
where
n˜(0)k,t =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
n(0)k,t if y
(0)
k,t
<
skt
nk +mk − 1 ∨
(
L
n(0)k,t ,n
(0)
k,t
(0) ≥ 1∧L
n(0)k,t ,n
(0)
k,t
(m) ≤ 1
)
n(0)k,t if y
(0)
k,t
>
skt +mk − 1
nk +mk − 1 ∨
(
L
n(0)k,t ,n
(0)
k,t
(0) ≤ 1∧L
n(0)k,t ,n
(0)
k,t
(m) ≥ 1
)
optimised otherwise
The result for Rsys(·) is completely analogous. It is interesting to note that if mk = 1 the bounds are sharp on stochastic 
dominance. In particular, when mk = 1, y(0)k,t < s
k
t
nk
indicates the lower bound is not in conﬂict with the observed data, whilst 
y(0)k,t >
skt
nk
is in conﬂict since the observed empirical probability of functioning at time t is below the prior lower bound. 
Consequently, note that n(0)k,t is used only when the prior comes into conﬂict with the data. Since n
(0)
k,t controls the prior 
certainty, this accords with the intuition that the least certain prior bound is invoked when in a conﬂict setting and the 
more certain prior bound used when the data agrees.
6.2. Prior parameter choice
In the following, we will give some guidelines on how to choose the parameter sets (0)k,1, . . . , 
(0)
k,tmax
which deﬁne the 
set of prior discrete reliability functions for components of type k. We advocate that this is much easier in terms of n(0) and 
y(0) than it would be in terms of α and β .
As mentioned in Section 3, the functioning probabilities pkt must satisfy p
k
t j ≥ pkt j+1 . This naturally translates to conditions 
on the prior for pkt , so that for example y
(0)
k,t j
≥ y(0)k,t j+1 and y
(0)
k,t j
≥ y(0)k,t j+1 should hold. Because skt /nk is decreasing in t , the 
weighted average property of the update step in Equation (4) for yk,t ensures that y
(n)
k,t j
≥ y(n)k,t j+1 and y
(n)
k,t j
≥ y(n)k,t j+1 . In 
situations where one has a high degree of certainty about the functioning probability for low t , but less certainty about 
what happens for larger t , then one can let y(0)k,t drop to (almost) 0, but clearly y
(0)
k,t should not increase.
It is inadvisable to express certainty in the expected functioning probabilities with n(0)k,t bounds that vary substantially 
over the range of t . With (strongly) differing n(0)k,t bounds, monotonicity of the y
(n)
k,t bounds cannot be guaranteed. For 
example, if y(0)k,t j = y
(0)
k,t j+1 , y
(0)
k,t j
= y(0)k,t j+1 , and skt j/nk ∈ [y
(0)
k,t j
, y(0)k,t j ] (meaning there is no prior–data conﬂict), then should 
there be no observed failures in [t j, t j+1], so that skt j+1/nk = skt j/nk , then
n(0)k,t j < n
(0)
k,t j+1 =⇒ y
(n)
k,t j
< y(n)k,t j+1 and
n(0)k,t j > n
(0)
k,t j+1 =⇒ y(n)k,t j < y
(n)
k,t j+1
Again, this follows from (4), the weighted average property. It is possible to construct similar examples with regard to the 
lower bound n(0)k,t j . Therefore, we advise taking the same n
(0)
k,t bounds for all t as far as possible. If they do change, it must 
be very gradual and we recommend diagnosing any problems as above.
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Generally, the interpretation as pseudocount or prior strength should guide the choice of bounds for n(0)k,t ; low values 
for n(0)k,t as compared to the test sample size nk give low weight to the prior expected functioning probability intervals 
[y(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ], and the location of posterior intervals [y(n)k,t , y(n)k,t ] will be dominated by the location of skt /nk . Furthermore, the 
length of [y(n)k,t , y(n)k,t ] is shorter for low n(0)k,t values. Speciﬁcally, in a no-conﬂict situation, when n(0)k,t = nk then [y(n)k,t , y(n)k,t ] has 
half the length of [y(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ]. In contrast, high values for n(0)k,t will lead to slower learning and wider y(n)k,t intervals, which 
means more cautious posterior inferences. The difference between n(0)k,t and n
(0)
k,t determines the strength of the prior–data 
conﬂict sensitivity; as is clear from Fig. 2 and (8), the wider the n(0)k,t interval, the wider [y(n)k,t , y(n)k,t ] in case of conﬂict. So it 
seems useful to choose n(0)k,t = 1 or n(0)k,t = 2, while choosing n(0)k,t with help of the half-width rule as described above.
As mentioned in Section 5, it is not advisable to choose y(0)k,t = 0 and y(0)k,t = 1. For any t 
∈
(
min(tk), max(tk)
)
, this can 
lead to improper posterior predictive distributions. However, it is possible to choose values close to 0 and 1, respectively, 
and due to the linear update step (4) for y(n)k,t , posterior inferences are not overly sensitive to whether y
(n)
k,t = 0.99 or 
y(n)k,t = 0.9999. Likewise, our nonparametric method does not cause unintuitive tail behaviour as some parametric methods 
do; there is no problem, for example, with assigning y(n)k,t near-zero for large t if prior knowledge suggests so.
While it is possible to set the bounds y(0)k,t and y
(0)
k,t for each t ∈ T individually, in practice this will be often too time-
consuming when T forms a dense grid. Switching to a coarser time grid will waste information from data, as then failure 
times in the test data are rounded up to the next t ∈ T . In the examples here we elicit bounds for a subset of T and ﬁll 
up the time grid with the least committal bounds, i.e., taking y(0)k,t equal to last (in the time sequence) elicited y
(0)
k,t , and 
likewise y(0)k,t equal to next (in time sequence) elicited y
(0)
k,t . A possible elicitation procedure in this vein could be to start 
with eliciting y(0)k,t bounds for a few ‘central’ time points t , ﬁlling up the grid as described above accordingly, and then to 
further reﬁne the obtained bounds as deemed necessary by the expert.
7. Practical usage and examples
7.1. Software
The methods of this paper have been implemented in the R [21] package ReliabilityTheory [2], providing an easy 
to use interface for reliability practitioners. The primary function, which computes the upper and lower posterior predictive 
system survival probabilities as in (10), is named nonParBayesSystemInferencePriorSets(). The user speciﬁes 
the times at which to evaluate the bounds, the survival signature ((·)), the component test data (t1, . . . , tK ), and the prior 
parameter set for each component type and time ((0)k,t , via n
(0)
k,t , n
(0)
k,t , y
(0)
k,t , and y
(0)
k,t ). All computations of Rsys and Rsys at 
different time points are performed in parallel automatically when the CPU has multiple cores and making automatic use 
of the theoretical results in Section 6 where applicable, performing exhaustive search in the few cases they are not.
Note that computation of the system signature itself can be simpliﬁed by expressing the structure of the system as an 
undirected graph using the computeSystemSurvivalSignature() function in the same package, leaving only data 
and prior to be handled. These publicly available functions have been used in computing all the following examples for 
reproducibility. See Appendix C for further details of how to use this software.
7.2. Examples
7.2.1. Toy example
As a toy example, consider a ‘bridge’ type system layout with three types of components T1, T2 and T3, as depicted 
in Fig. 4. The survival signature for this system is given in Table 1. All rows with T3 = 0 have been omitted; without T3, 
the system cannot function, thus  = 0. For component types T1 and T2, we consider a near-noninformative set of prior 
reliability functions. For components of type T3, we consider an informative set of prior reliability functions as given in 
Table 2. This set could result from eliciting prior functioning probabilities at times 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 only, and ﬁlling up the rest. 
These prior assumptions, together with sets of posterior reliability functions resulting from three different scenarios for test 
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Survival signature for the bridge system from Fig. 4, omitting all 
rows with T3 = 0, since  = 0 for these.
T1 T2 T3  T1 T2 T3 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
2 0 1 0.33 2 1 1 0.67
3 0 1 1 3 1 1 1
4 0 1 1 4 1 1 1
Table 2
Lower and upper prior functioning probability bounds for compo-
nent type T3 in the ‘bridge’ system example.
t [0,1) [1,2) [2,3) [3,4) [4,5)
y(0)3,t 0.625 0.375 0.250 0.125 0.010
y(0)3,t 0.999 0.875 0.500 0.375 0.250
Fig. 5. Prior and posterior sets of reliability functions for the ‘bridge’ system and its three component types, with failure times as expected for component 
type T3. Test data failure times are denoted with tick marks near the time axis.
data for component type T3, are illustrated in Figs. 5, 6 and 7; test data for components of type T1 and T2 are invariably 
taken as t1 = (2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 2.8) and t2 = (3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 3.8), respectively.
In Fig. 5, test data for component type T3 is t3 = (0.5, 1.5, 2.5, 3.5), and so in line with expectations. The posterior set of 
reliability functions for each component type and the whole system is considerably smaller compared to the prior set (due 
to the low prior strength intervals [n(0)1,t , n(0)1,t ] = [n(0)2,t , n(0)2,t ] = [1, 2], [n(0)3,t , n(0)3,t ] = [1, 4]) and so giving more precise reliability 
statements. We see that posterior lower and upper functioning probabilities drop at those times t when there is a failure 
time in the test data, or a drop in the prior functioning probability bounds. Note that the lower bound for the prior system 
reliability function is zero due to the prior lower bound of zero for T1; for the system to function, at least two components 
of type T1 must function.
In Fig. 6, test data of component type T3 is t3 = (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9), and so earlier than expected. Compared to Fig. 5, pos-
terior functioning intervals for T3 are wider between t = 1 and t = 3.5, reﬂecting additional imprecision due to prior–data 
conﬂict. For t > 1, it is clearly visible how y(n)3,t is halfway between y
(0)
3,t and s
3
t /n3 = 0 (weights n(0)3,t = 4 and n3 = 4), while 
y(n)3,t is one-ﬁfth of y
(0)
3,t (weights n
(0)
3,t = 1 and n3 = 4). Note that the posterior system functioning probability is constant for 
t ∈ [1, 2] because in that interval the prior functioning probability is constant and there are no observed failures.
In Fig. 7, test data of component type T3 is t3 = (4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4), and so observed failures are later than expected. 
Here we see that for t ∈ [2, 4], posterior functioning bounds for T3 are even wider than prior functioning bounds. The width 
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Fig. 7. Prior and posterior sets of reliability functions for the ‘bridge’ type system and its three component types, with failure times later as expected for 
component type T3.
turns back to being half the prior width only after the four failures. The imprecision carries over to the system bounds, 
where we see wider bounds as compared to the other two scenarios especially between t = 2 and t = 4. In particular, also 
note that at the system level posterior bounds are a subset of prior bounds after t = 2.6, although prior–data conﬂict for 
the individual component type T3 extends well beyond t = 4. This demonstrates the power of this technique to identify 
prior–data conﬂict which is actually consequential at the system level, not just the component level — in other words, for 
mission times t > 2.6, we can diagnose that the prior–data conﬂict need not be of elevated concern for this system viewed 
as a whole. Nevertheless, the posterior system reliability bounds are wider than in the no-conﬂict case for t ∈ [1, 4.4], 
signalising the general need for caution in this scenario.
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Survival signature values 
∈ {0, 1} for the simpliﬁed automotive brake system de-
picted in Fig. 8.
M H C P  M H C P 
1 0 1 1 0.25 1 0 2 1 0.50
1 0 1 2 0.50 1 0 2 2 0.83
1 0 1 3 0.75 1 0 3 1 0.75
0 1 0 1 0.50 1 1 0 1 0.50
0 1 0 2 0.83 1 1 0 2 0.83
0 1 1 1 0.62 1 1 1 1 0.62
0 1 1 2 0.92 1 1 1 2 0.92
0 1 2 1 0.75 1 1 2 1 0.75
0 1 2 2 0.97 1 1 2 2 0.97
0 1 3 1 0.88 1 1 3 1 0.88
Fig. 8. Prior and posterior sets of reliability functions for a simpliﬁed automotive brake system with layout as depicted in the lower right panel.
7.2.2. Automotive brake system
We also consider a simpliﬁed automotive brake system. The master brake cylinder (M) activates all four wheel brake 
cylinders (C1–C4), which in turn actuate a braking pad assembly each (P1–P4). The hand brake mechanism (H) goes directly 
to the brake pad assemblies P3 and P4; the car brakes when at least one brake pad assembly is actuated. All values for 
 
∈ {0, 1} are given in Table 3. The system layout is depicted in Fig. 8, together with prior and posterior sets of reliability 
functions for the four component types and the complete system. Observed lifetimes from test data are indicated by tick 
marks in each of the four component type panels, where nM = 5, nH = 10, nC = 15, and nP = 20. We consider 301 evenly 
spaced time points t on [0, 10], assume [n(0)M,t, n(0)M,t] = [1, 8] ∀t , and [n(0)k,t , n(0)k,t ] = [1, 2] for k ∈ {H, C, P} and all t . Prior 
functioning probability bounds for M are based on a Weibull cdf with shape 2.5 and scales 6 and 8 for the lower and upper 
bound, respectively. The prior bounds for P can be seen as the least committal bounds derived from an expert statement of 
y(0)P,t ∈ [0.5, 0.65] for t = 5 only. For H, near-noninformative prior functioning probability bounds have been selected; with 
the upper bound for P being approximately one for t ≤ 5 as well, the prior upper system reliability bound for t ≤ 5 is close 
to one, too, since the system can function on H and one of P3 and P4 alone. Note that the posterior functioning probability 
interval for M is wide not only due to the limited number of observations, but also because n(0)M,t = 8 and the prior–data 
conﬂict reaction.
Posterior functioning probability bounds for the complete system are much more precise than the prior system bounds, 
reﬂecting the information gained from component test data. The posterior system bounds can be also seen to reﬂect location 
and precision of the component bounds; for example, the system bounds drop drastically between t = 2.5 and t = 3.5 mainly 
due to the drop of the bounds for P at that time.
It is also interesting to note that the prior–data conﬂict which is consequential at the system level occurs over roughly 
the same range in t as there is prior–data conﬂict for component type P. Indeed, this occurs despite there being prior–data 
conﬂict in both M and C over much larger ranges, giving valuable insight into which prior requires further expert attention 
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propagated to the uncertainty in the whole system.
In this example, the theory presented in Section 6 enabled avoiding numerical optimisation in 91.9% of cases for Rsys(·)
and in 95.7% of cases for Rsys(·). Further detail is in Appendix B.3.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we have contributed an imprecise Bayesian nonparametric approach to system reliability with multiple 
types of components. The approach allows modelling partial or imperfect prior knowledge on component failure distri-
butions in a ﬂexible way through bounds on the functioning probability for a grid of time points, and combines this 
information with test data in an imprecise Bayesian framework. Component-wise predictions on the number of functioning 
components are then combined to bounds for the system survival probability by means of the survival signature. New re-
sults on ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance for the Beta-Binomial distribution enable closed-form solutions for these bounds in 
most cases and avoid exponential growth in the complexity of computing the estimate as the number of components grows. 
The widths of the resulting system reliability bounds reﬂect the amount of test data, the precision of prior knowledge, and 
crucially provide an easily used method to identify whether these two information sources are in conﬂict in a way which is 
of consequence to the whole system reliability estimate.
These methodological contributions can be immediately used in applications by reliability practitioners as we provide 
easy to use software tools.
An important next step is to extend the model to include right-censored observations which are common in the reliability 
setting. In particular, this allows to use component failure observations from a running system to calculate its remaining 
useful life. We see two potential approaches. First, to obtain lower and upper system reliability bounds one can assume that 
a component either fails immediately after censoring or continues to function during the entire time horizon. This minimal 
assumption will be simple to implement but will lead to high imprecision. Alternatively, one can assume exchangeability 
with other surviving components at the moment of censoring. This approach will be more complex to accommodate but 
will lead to less imprecision. Indeed, this assumption lies at the core of the Kaplan–Meier estimator [18], and has already 
been adopted by Coolen and Yan [15] in an imprecise probability context.
Upscaling the survival signature to large real-world systems and networks, consisting of thousands of components, is a 
major challenge. However, even for such systems the fact that one only needs to derive the survival signature once for a 
system is an advantage, and also the monotonicity of the survival signature for coherent systems is very useful if one can 
only derive it partially.
The survival signature and its use for uncertainty quantiﬁcation for system reliability can be generalised quite straight-
forwardly, mainly due to the simplicity of this concept. For example, one may generalise the system structure function 
from a binary function to a probability (see [13]), to reﬂect uncertainty about system functioning for known states of its 
components, with a further generalisation to imprecise probabilities possible.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1, p. 75. Consider the likelihood ratio for the two Beta Binomial distributions βy and βy ,
L(l) := p(l | y,n,m, s,N)
p(l | y,n,m, s,N)
= B(l + ny + s,m− l + n(1− y) + N − s)B(ny + s,n(1− y) + N − s)
B(ny + s,n(1− y) + N − s)B(l + ny + s,m− l + n(1− y) + N − s)
= (l + ny + s)(m− l + n(1− y) + N − s)(ny + s)(n(1− y) + N − s)
(l + ny + s)(m− l + n(1− y) + N − s)(ny + s)(n(1− y) + N − s)
82 G. Walter et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 80 (2017) 67–88=
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∏m−1
x=0 (x+ n(1− y) + N − s)∏m−1
x=0 (x+ n(1− y) + N − s)
for l = 0
∏l−1
x=0(x+ ny + s)
∏m−l−1
x=0 (x+ n(1− y) + N − s)∏l−1
x=0(x+ ny + s)
∏m−l−1
x=0 (x+ n(1− y) + N − s)
for 0< l <m
∏m−1
x=0 (x+ ny + s)∏m−1
x=0 (x+ ny + s)
for l =m
since (x + 1) = x(x).
Thus,
L(l + 1)
L(l) =
(l + ny + s)(m− l − 1+ n(1− y) + N − s)
(l + ny + s)(m− l − 1+ n(1− y) + N − s)
> 1 when 0≤ y < y ≤ 1
Hence, L(·) is monotone increasing for 0 < y < y < 1, so that βy is larger than or equal to βy in monotone likelihood 
ratio order (βy ≥lr βy). But, βy ≥lr βy =⇒ βy ≥st βy [23, Theorem 1.C.1, p. 43] giving the required result. 
Proof of Theorem 2, p. 75. Consider the likelihood ratio for the two Beta Binomial distributions βn and βn ,
L(l) := p(l | y,n,m, s,N)
p(l | y,n,m, s,N)
= B(l + ny + s,m− l + n(1− y) + N − s)B(ny + s,n(1− y) + N − s)
B(ny + s,n(1− y) + N − s)B(l + ny + s,m− l + n(1− y) + N − s)
= (l + ny + s)(m− l + n(1− y) + N − s)
(l + ny + s)(m− l + n(1− y) + N − s)
× (ny + s)(n(1− y) + N − s)(n+ N)(m+ n+ N)
(ny + s)(n(1− y) + N − s)(n+ N)(m+ n+ N)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∏m−1
x=0 (x+ n(1− y) + N − s)
∏m−1
x=0 (x+ n+ N)∏m−1
x=0 (x+ n(1− y) + N − s)
∏m−1
x=0 (x+ n+ N)
for l = 0
∏l−1
x=0(x+ ny + s)
∏m−l−1
x=0 (x+ n(1− y) + N − s)∏l−1
x=0(x+ ny + s)
∏m−l−1
x=0 (x+ n(1− y) + N − s)
×
∏m−1
x=0 (x+ n+ N)∏m−1
x=0 (x+ n+ N)
for 0< l <m∏m−1
x=0 (x+ ny + s)
∏m−1
x=0 (x+ n+ N)∏m−1
x=0 (x+ ny + s)
∏m−1
x=0 (x+ n+ N)
for l =m
since (x + 1) = x(x).
Thus,
L(l + 1)
L(l) =
(l + ny + s)(m− l − 1+ n(1− y) + N − s)
(l + ny + s)(m− l − 1+ n(1− y) + N − s)
However, unlike the case for the y parameter in Theorem 1, neither βn nor βn can be guaranteed to dominate for all 
possible values for the other parameters, so that necessary conditions for monotonicity (either increasing or decreasing) 
must be established. We require,
(l + ny + s)(m− l − 1+ n(1− y) + N − s)
(l + ny + s)(m− l − 1+ n(1− y) + N − s) > 1
After extensive routine algebra, this can be conveniently expressed as
(n− n)[y(N +m− 1) − s] − l(n− n) > 0.
This limit is hardest to satisfy for l =m − 1 since n − n > 0 (note l 
=m since we are evaluating L(l + 1)/L(l), so m − 1 is 
the maximal value l can take). Thus, for monotonicity to hold for all l, we require
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=⇒ (n− n)[y(N +m− 1) − s −m+ 1] > 0
Since n− n > 0 by deﬁnition, we have a monotonically increasing likelihood ratio only when
y(N +m− 1) − s −m+ 1> 0.
By a similar argument, the likelihood ratio is only monotonically decreasing when
y(N +m− 1) − s < 0.
Thus,
y >
s +m− 1
N +m− 1 =⇒ βn ≥lr βn =⇒ βn ≥st βn (A.1)
and
y <
s
N +m− 1 =⇒ βn ≤lr βn =⇒ βn ≤st βn (A.2)
by [23, Theorem 1.C.1, p. 43]. In the intermediate case,
s
N +m− 1 < y <
s +m− 1
N +m− 1
standard likelihood ratio ordering theory cannot deﬁnitively state the stochastic ordering on βn and βn . 
Proof of Lemma 3, p. 75. (A.1) and (A.2) are suﬃcient but not necessary conditions. Using theory in [19] we can sharpen 
these conditions to provide ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance conditions for a larger range of parameter values.
Proposition 2.1, p. 399 of [19] proves that half-monotone likelihood ratio ordering — i.e. monotonicity of L(l + 1)/L(l) — 
together with left and right tail conditions on L(·) imply ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
Half-monotonicity of L(·)
Although there exist parameters for which L(·) is not monotone, it is half-monotone. That is, L(l + 1)/L(l) is itself 
monotone. For simplicity, write
L(l + 1)
L(l) =
(l + ψ)(η − l)
(l + ψ)(η − l) where
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ψ = ny + s
ψ = ny + s
η =m− 1+ n(1− y) + N − s
η =m− 1+ n(1− y) + N − s
Then,
L(l + 2)/L(l + 1)
L(l + 1)/L(l) =
(ψ + l)(ψ + l + 1)(η − l − 1)(η − l)
(ψ + l + 1)(ψ + l)(η − l)(η − l − 1) < 1
⇐⇒ ψ + l
ψ + l ·
η − l − 1
η − l − 1 <
ψ + l + 1
ψ + l + 1 ·
η − l
η − l
But, ψ > ψ > 0, η > η > 0, l > 0, so it is trivial to prove
ψ + l
ψ + l <
ψ + l + 1
ψ + l + 1 and
η − l − 1
η − l − 1 <
η − l
η − l ∀ l ∈ {0, . . . ,m}
Thus we can conclude that L(·) is half monotone decreasing.
Tail conditions on L(·)
It is not diﬃcult to derive the same loose bounds as in Theorem 2 using the tail conditions. However, it is also easy to 
see that these are suﬃcient but not necessary. Sharpening these bounds in terms of the other parameter values involves 
seemingly intractable algebra, so we leave the tail condition as the alternative slightly more costly numerical check when 
the conditions of Theorem 2 are not satisﬁed. Evaluation of L(·) at two values is still orders of magnitude less costly than 
reevaluation of Rsys(·) or Rsys(·). 
84 G. Walter et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 80 (2017) 67–88Fig. B.9. Plots of the probability that numerical optimisation is required when N = 100, m = 3, n = 1 and n = 5 for changing choices of prior, y, as a 
function of the unknown functioning probability, p.
Fig. B.10. Plots of the probability that numerical optimisation is required when y = 0.1, m = 3, n = 1 and n = 5 for changing amounts of test data, N , as a 
function of the unknown functioning probability, p.
Fig. B.11. Plots of the probability that numerical optimisation is required when y = 0.4, N = 100, n = 1 and n = 5 for differing numbers of components in 
the system, m, as a function of the unknown functioning probability, p.
Appendix B. Theory versus optimisation
The above theory substantially reduces the amount that numerical optimisation must be used. Herein, we examine more 
carefully precisely how often the theory cannot be applied, resulting in numerical optimisation being used.
Given some unknown functioning probability p, which gives rise to the observed data s, the probability that Theorem 2
does not apply is
P (y(N +m− 1) −m+ 1< s < y(N +m− 1)) =
y(N+m−1)∑
i=y(N+m−1)−m+1
(
N
i
)
pi(1− p)N−i
Likewise the probability that Lemma 3 does not apply is
P (Ln,n(0) 1∩Ln,n(m) 1) =
∑
s∈S
(
N
s
)
ps(1− p)N−s
where S =
{
s : p(0 | y,n,m, s,N)
p(0 | y,n,m, s,N)  1∩
p(m | y,n,m, s,N)
p(m | y,n,m, s,N)  1
}
B.1. Some example scenarios
With the prior value y (upper or lower) ﬁxed, the above expressions depend only on the unknown functioning probabil-
ity p, which gives rise under repeated experiments to an observed number of functioning components, s.
Thus, Figs. B.9, B.10 and B.11 show how often optimisation would be required under long term repeated use of this 
technique.
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and n = 5. There are some artefacts due to the underlying discrete Binomial probabilities.
Fig. B.13. Plots of the worst case probability that numerical optimisation is required for different choices of y, when m = 3 (left), N = 100 (right), n = 1
and n = 5, subject to the constraint |y − p| > 0.1. There are some artefacts due to the underlying discrete Binomial probabilities.
The worst case scenario is that the prior, y, is exactly equal to the true unknown probability of functioning, p. Regardless 
of y, optimisation is required less frequently with larger test dataset sizes (increasing N), but offset by increasing numbers 
of components of the same type in a system (increasing m). Not shown is that n and n clearly do not affect the probability 
that Theorem 2 does not apply, but also the impact on Lemma 3 is negligible.
B.2. Worst case scenario
Clearly the true functioning probability, p, is unknown. Fig. B.12 therefore shows the worst case scenario for any choice 
of y — that is, where the maximum of each curve from the previous subsection is taken.
Especially given the upper and lower choices of y, it may be reasonable to suppose that it is unlikely that the prior 
probability will all that often exactly equal the true failure probability (at least not for long stretches of time). Therefore, a 
ﬁnal pair of plots replicates the analysis in Fig. B.12, but where the worst case p is subject to the constraint |y − p| > 0.1. 
This is shown in Fig. B.13.
Note that all these analyses are for evaluation of a single ﬁxed time point at which Rsys(·) or Rsys(·) is computed. Of 
relevance to the overall compute time is the behaviour over time, and it seems unlikely that the worst case scenario will 
occur for long runs of the times under analysis.
B.3. Theoretical analysis for brake system example
Such temporal aspects are now considered by analysing the brake system example from Section 7.2.2. As noted in Sec-
tion 7.2.2, the grid contains 301 time points and the system has 4 types of components, meaning stochastic dominance 
must be veriﬁed via theory or optimisation 1, 204 times for each of Rsys(·) and Rsys(·).
Fig. B.14 shows the worst case probabilities (subject to |y − p| > 0.1) as they change over time in the brake system 
example. Displayed are the worst case probabilities that optimisation will be required for the choice of prior and the values 
of m and N as in Section 7.2.2, but without using the test data (which deﬁne s). Note in particular that when m = 1 (as is 
the case for component types M and H), Lemma 3 always applies for y ∈ (0, 1) and so optimisation is never required. This 
is true for all values of N and y.
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For the test data as used in Section 7.2.2, theory could not determine stochastic dominance in 98 (or 8.1%) of cases for 
Rsys(·), while it was in 52 (or 4.3%) of cases for Rsys(·).
Appendix C. Software details
Functions which make it easy to use the methods of this paper have been added to the R package ReliabilityThe-
ory [2]. There are two functions of particular note: computeSystemSurvivalSignature and, implementing the result 
from Appendix A above, nonParBayesSystemInferencePriorSets.
C.1. Computing the survival signature
The function computeSystemSurvivalSignature allows easy computation of the survival signature if the system 
is expressed as an undirected graph with ‘start’ and ‘terminal’ nodes (which are not considered components for survival 
signature computation). The system is considered to work if there is a path from the start to the terminal node passing only 
through functioning components.
Graph representations of systems are most simply deﬁned by using the graph.formula function. The ‘start’ node 
should be denoted s and the ‘terminal’ node should be denoted t and intermediate nodes (representing actual components) 
should be numbered and connected by edges denoted by -, where the numbering denotes physically distinct components. 
Component numbers can be repeated to include multiple links. For example, to build a simple three component series 
system:
sys <- graph.formula(s-1-2-3-t)
and to build a three component parallel system:
sys <- graph.formula(s-1-t, s-2-t, s-3-t)
There is an additional shorthand which indicates a link exists to a list of multiple components separated by the :
operator, so that the parallel system can be also be expressed more compactly by:
sys <- graph.formula(s-1:2:3-t)
Therefore, the simple bridge system of Fig. 4 can be constructed with:
sys <- graph.formula(s-1-2-3-t, s -4-5-3-t, 1:4-6-2:5)
• s-1-2-3-t signiﬁes the route from left to right entering the ﬁrst component going across the top of the system 
block diagram in Fig. 4;
• s-4-5-3-t signiﬁes the bottom route through the block diagram;
• 1:4-6-2:5 connects the top two components of type 3 to the bottom two components of type 3, signifying the 
bridge.
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sys <- graph.formula(s-1:4-6-2:5-3 -t, 1-2, 4-5)
With the structure deﬁned and the individual components numbered, it just remains to specify the types of each com-
ponent. This can be done using the setCompTypes function. This function takes the system graph and a list of component 
type names (as the tag) and corresponding component numbers (as the value). Thus, completing the example for Fig. 4:
sys <- setCompTypes(sys, list("T1"=c(1,2,4,5), "T2"=c(6), "T3"=c(3)))
Computing the survival signature then involves a simple function call:
survsig <- computeSystemSurvivalSignature(sys)
C.2. Computing sets of system survival probabilities
Once the system has been correctly described using an undirected graph as above, the methods presented in Sections 3
— 6 can be used via the function nonParBayesSystemInferencePriorSets.
The function prototype is:
nonParBayesSystemInferencePriorSets(at.times, survival.signature,
test.data, nLower=2, nUpper=2, yLower=0.5, yUpper=0.5)
Aside from the system design, which can be passed to the function via the survival.signature argument, the 
remaining elements which must be speciﬁed are the:
1. grid of times at which to evaluate the posterior, T = {t1, . . . , tmax}, via the at.times argument.
2. component test data tk = (tk1, . . . , tknk ) for k = 1, . . . , K , via the test.data argument.
3. prior sets via the range of prior parameter sets (0)k,t = [n(0)k,t , n(0)k,t ] × [y(0)k,t , y(0)k,t ], via the nLower, nUpper, yLower and
yUpper arguments.
The grid of times, at.times, is speciﬁed as simply a vector of time points.
The test.data argument is a list of component type names (as the tag) and corresponding lifetime data (as the value), 
for example a toy sized dataset for each component would be expressed as:
test.data=list("T1"=c(0.19, 0.73, 1.87, 1.17),
"T2"=c(0.22, 0.27, 0.63, 1.80, 1.25, 1.95),
"T3"=c(1.33, 0.65, 1.59))
Finally, there are multiple options for specifying the prior parameter sets. Each of the nLower, nUpper, yLower and
yUpper arguments can be speciﬁed as:
• a single value for a homogeneous prior across time and components. e.g. nLower=2 =⇒ n(0)k,t = 2 ∀ k, t• a vector of values of length |T | (length(at.times)), for a time inhomogeneous prior which is identical across 
component types.
• a data frame of size 1 × K , where each column is named the same as in the survival.signature and test.data
arguments, for a time homogeneous prior which varies across component types.
• a data frame of size |T | × K , where each column is named the same as in the survival.signature and
test.data arguments, for a time inhomogeneous prior which varies across component types.
With these arguments supplied, nonParBayesSystemInferencePriorSets will then compute the posterior sets 
automatically in parallel across the cores of a multicore CPU and return a list with two objects, named lower and upper, 
containing respectively the lower and upper bound for the system reliability function Rsys(t).
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